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Chapter 1
On the Logic of Lying
Hans van Ditmarsch, Jan van Eijck, Floor Sietsma, and Yanjing Wang
Abstract We model lying as a communicative act changing the beliefs of the agents
in a multi-agent system. With Augustine, we see lying as an utterance believed to
be false by the speaker and uttered with the intent to deceive the addressee. The
deceit is successful if the lie is believed after the utterance by the addressee. This
is our perspective. Also, as common in dynamic epistemic logics, we model the
agents addressed by the lie, but we do not (necessarily) model the speaker as one
of those agents. This further simplifies the picture: we do not need to model the
intention of the speaker, nor do we need to distinguish between knowledge and
belief of the speaker: he is the observer of the system and his beliefs are taken to be
the truth by the listeners. We provide a sketch of what goes on logically when a lie
is communicated. We present a complete logic of manipulative updating, to analyse
the effects of lying in public discourse. Next, we turn to the study of lying in games.
First, a game-theoretical analysis is used to explain how the possibility of lying
makes games such as Liar’s Dice interesting, and how lying is put to use in optimal
strategies for playing the game. This is the opposite of the logical manipulative
update: instead of always believing the utterance, now, it is never believed. We also
give a matching logical analysis for the games perspective, and implement that in
the model checker DEMO. Our running example of lying in games is the game of
Liar’s Dice.
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1.1 What is a Lie?
The church father St. Augustine, who wrote at length about lying in De Mendacio
[3], holds a subtle view on what lying is and what it is not. We will take his view as
our point of departure. Here is his famous quote on what lying is not.
For not every one who says a false thing lies, if he believes or opines that to be true which
he says. Now between believing and opining there is this difference, that sometimes he who
believes feels that he does not know that which he believes, (although he may know himself
to be ignorant of a thing, and yet have no doubt at all concerning it, if he most firmly believes
it:) whereas he who opines, thinks he knows that which he does not know. Now whoever
utters that which he holds in his mind either as belief or as opinion, even though it be false,
he lies not. For this he owes to the faith of his utterance, that he thereby produce that which
he holds in his mind, and has in that way in which he produces it. Not that he is without
fault, although he lie not, if either he believes what he ought not to believe, or thinks he
knows what he knows not, even though it should be true: for he accounts an unknown thing
for a known.
Augustine, De Mendacio (On Lying), ca. AD 395 [3]
And on what lying is:
Wherefore, that man lies, who has one thing in his mind and utters another in words, or by
signs of whatever kind. Whence also the heart of him who lies is said to be double; that is,
there is a double thought: the one, of that thing which he either knows or thinks to be true
and does not produce; the other, of that thing which he produces instead thereof, knowing
or thinking it to be false. Whence it comes to pass, that he may say a false thing and yet
not lie, if he thinks it to be so as he says although it be not so; and, that he may say a true
thing, and yet lie, if he thinks it to be false and utters it for true, although in reality it be
so as he utters it. For from the sense of his own mind, not from the verity or falsity of the
things themselves, is he to be judged to lie or not to lie. Therefore he who utters a false thing
for a true, which however he opines to be true, may be called erring and rash: but he is not
rightly said to lie; because he has not a double heart when he utters it, neither does he wish
to deceive, but is deceived. But the fault of him who lies, is the desire of deceiving in the
uttering of his mind; whether he do deceive, in that he is believed when uttering the false
thing; or whether he do not deceive, either in that he is not believed, or in that he utters a
true thing with will to deceive, which he does not think to be true: wherein being believed,
he does not deceive though it was his will to deceive: except that he deceives in so far as he
is thought to know or think as he utters.
Augustine, [3]
We cannot do better than to follow Augustine in assuming that the intention to mis-
lead is part of the definition of a liar. Thus, to us, lying that p is communicating p
in the belief that ¬p is the case, with the intent to be believed.
The deceitinvolved in a lie that p is successful, if p is believed by the addressee
after the speaker’s utterance. This is our perspective. As common in dynamic epis-
temic logics, we model the agents addressed by the lie, but we do not (necessarily)
model the speaker as one of those agents. Dynamic epistemics models how to in-
corporate novel information after the decision to accept that information, just like
in ‘belief revision’. We do not claim that this decision is irrelevant, far from that,
but merely that this is a useful abstraction allowing us to focus on the information
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change only. This further simplifies the picture: we do not need to model the inten-
tion of the speaker, nor do we need to distinguish between knowledge and belief
of the speaker: he is the observer of the system and his beliefs are taken to be the
truth by the listeners. In other words, instead of having a precondition ‘the speaker
believes that p is false’ for a lie, we have as a precondition ‘p is false’.
We will model lying in a modal logic. In this logic, knowledge is modelled by
so-called S 5 modal operators and belief by KD45 operators. The logic also allows
for even less specific notions than knowledge or belief. Our analysis applies to all
equally, and for all such epistemic notions we will use a doxastic modal operator
Bip, for ‘agent i believes that p’. Our analysis is not intended as a contribution to
epistemology. We are aware of the philosophical difficulties with the treatment of
knowledge as (justified) true belief [22].
It is also possible to model the speaker explicitly in a modal logic of lying (and we
will do so in examples) and extend our analysis to multi-agent systems wherein the
deceptive interaction between speakers and hearers is explicit in that way. However,
we do not explore that systematically in this proposal.
The intention to be believed can also be modelled in a (modal) logical language,
namely by employing, for each agent, a preference relation that is independent from
the accessibility relation for belief. This is to account for the fact that people can
believe things for which they have no preference, and vice versa. This perspective
is, e.g., employed in the recent appearance [28]—this contains further references to
the expansive literature on beliefs and intentions.
The moral sides to the issue of lying are clarified in the ninth of the ten command-
ments (‘Thou shalt not bear false witness’) and the fourth of the five Buddhist pre-
cepts (‘I undertake the precept to refrain from false speech’). On the other hand, in
the Analects of Confucius, Confucius is quoted as condoning a lie if its purpose is
to preserve social structure:
The Governor of She said to Confucius, ‘In our village we have an example of a straight
person. When the father stole a sheep, the son gave evidence against him.’ Confucius an-
swered, ‘In our village those who are straight are quite different. Fathers cover up for their
sons, and sons cover up for their fathers. In such behaviour is straightness to be found as a
matter of course.’ Analects, 13.18.
Among philosophical treatises, the quoted text of Augustine is a classic. For more,
see [13] and [2] and the references therein.
Rather than dwell on the moral side of the issue of lying, in this paper we will
study its logic, focusing on simple cases of lying in game situations, and on a par-
ticular kind of public announcement that may be deceptive and that we call ‘manip-
ulative update’. Thus, we abstract from the moral issues. We feel that it is important
to understand why lying is tempting (why and how it pays off) before addressing the
choice between condemnation and absolution.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, in Section 1.2, we link up to
the generic logic of communication and change. Next, in Section 1.3, we develop
our logic of lying in public discourse, treating a lie as an update with a commu-
nication believed to be truthful. Next, we turn to lying in games, by analyzing the
game of Liar’s Dice, first in terms of game theory (Section 1.4), next in terms of
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(an implementation of) our logical system (Section 1.5). Section 1.6 concludes with
a reflection on the difference between our logic of lying as manipulate update and
lying in Liar’s Dice.
1.2 The Logic of Communication and Change
The logic of communication and change presented in [12] provides means to model
communicative actions and actions that change the world, and their effects in given
epistemic situations. In this section we introduce the syntax and semantics of the
logic. In the next sections we show how this machinery can be put to use to analyse
manipulation in public discourse and to describe what goes on in the game of Liar’s
Dice. Rather than use the enhanced version based on the proposal in [18] to use
propositional dynamic logic as a logic of belief revision, we stick to simple doxastic
models, with plausibility relations that satisfy the KD45 axioms.
Definition 1.1 (Doxastic models). Let a set of propositional variables P and a fi-
nite set of agents N be given. A doxastic model is a triple M = (W,V,R) where W
is a set of worlds, V : W → P(P) assigns a valuation to each world w ∈ W, and
R : N → P(W2) assigns an accessibility relation i→ to each agent i ∈ N, satisfying
transitivity, seriality and euclideanness. (A binary relation R is euclidean if it satis-
fies ∀xyz((Rxy∧Rxz)→ Ryz).)
A pair M = (M,U) with U ⊆W is a multiple-pointed doxastic model, indicating
that the actual world is among U.
Note that in a multiple-pointed doxastic model (M,U), U is allowed to be empty,
indicating that the model pictures a doxastic situation that is incompatible with re-
ality.
If we also want to model the intention to deceive, we need to use doxastic pref-
erence models (W,V,R,S ), where S is a second relation for preference. Again, it is
reasonable to let S satisfy the KD45 postulates. But rather than carry such prefer-
ence relations along in the exposition, we will indicate at appropriate places how
they can be dealt with.
Baltag, Moss and Solecki [7] propose to model doxastic actions as doxastic mod-
els, with valuations replaced by preconditions. (See also: [4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 19, 20,
24].) Van Benthem, Van Eijck and Kooi [12] propose to add substitutions for mod-
elling change in the world (this proposal is based on [16]). See also [15]. The story
of update logic with substitutions is retold for a fragment in [23]. An interesting
early proposal for adding change operations to Dynamic Epistemic Logic is [27].
Definition 1.2 (Substitutions). L substitutions are functions of type L → L that
distribute over all language constructs, and that map all but a finite number of basic
propositions to themselves. L substitutions can be represented as sets of bindings
{p1 7→ φ1, . . . , pn 7→ φn}
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where all the pi are different. If σ is a L substitution, then the set {p ∈ P | σ(p) , p}
is called its domain, notation dom(σ). Use  for the identity substitution. Let SubL
be the set of all L substitutions.
This notion of ‘domain’ is from the logic programming tradition (see, e.g., [1]).
Definition 1.3 (Doxastic Models under a Substitution). If
M = (W,V,R)
is a doxastic model and σ is a L substitution (for an appropriate doxastic language
L), then VσM is the valuation given by λp ∈ P · [[σ(p)]]M . In other words, VσM assigns
to p the set of worlds w in which σ(p) is true. For M = (W,V,R), call Mσ the model
given by (W,VσM ,R).
Note1 that the functor σ 7→ [σ] given by [σ] : V 7→ Vσ is contravariant, i.e.,
[τ◦σ] = [σ]◦ [τ]. Cf. also [1].
Definition 1.4 (Action models for a given language L). Let a finite set of agents
N and a doxastic language L be given. An action model for L is a quadruple A =
(W,pre,sub,R) where
• W is a set of action states or events,
• pre : W →L assigns a precondition to each action state,
• sub : W → SubL assigns a substitution to each action state and
• R : N→P(W2) assigns a transitive, serial and euclidean accessibility relation i→
to each agent i ∈ N.
A pair A = (A,S ) with S ⊆W is a multiple-pointed action model, indicating that the
actual event that takes place is a member of S .
The doxastic language L is defined as follows.
Definition 1.5 (L). Assume p ranges over the set of basic propositions P, i ranges
over the set of agents N. The formulas of L are given by:
φ ::= > | p | ¬φ | φ1∧φ2 | [α]φ | [A,S ]φ,
α ::= i |?φ | α1∪α2 | α1;α2| α∗,
where (A,S ) is a multiple-pointed finite L (action) model.
We employ the usual abbreviations. In particular, φ1∨φ2 is shorthand for¬(¬φ1∧
¬φ2), φ1 → φ2 for ¬(φ1 ∧¬φ2), ]¬φ, 〈A,S 〉φ for ¬[A,S ]¬φ. Note that the standard
1 With thanks to one of our reviewers.
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doxastic language is a sublanguage of L, with “[i]φ” and “[(∪i∈N i)∗]φ” interpreted
as “Biφ” and “common belief in φ”, respectively.2
Let MOD be the class of multiple-pointed doxastic models and ACT the class of
multiple-pointed finite L models. Then L-update is an operation of the following
type:
⊗ : MOD×ACT→MOD.
The operation ⊗ and the truth definition for L are defined by mutual recursion, as
follows.
Definition 1.6 (Update, Truth). Given a multiple-pointed doxastic model (M,U)
and an action model (A,S ), we define
(M,U)⊗ (A,S )
as
((W′,V′,R′),U′),
where
W′ := {(w, s) | w ∈WM , s ∈WA,M |=w pres},
V′(w, s) := {p ∈ P | M |=w subs(p)},
(w, s)
i→ (w′, s′) ∈ R′ :≡ w i→ w′ ∈ RM and s i→ s′ ∈ RA,
U′ := {(u, s) | u ∈ U, s ∈ S , (u, s) ∈W′},
where the truth definition is given by:
M |=w > always
M |=w p :≡ p ∈ VM(w)
M |=w ¬φ :≡ not M |=w φ
M |=w φ1∧φ2 :≡ M |=w φ1 and M |=w φ2
M |=w [α]φ :≡ for all w′ with w α→ w′ M |=w′ φ
M |=w [A,S ]φ :≡ (W′,V ′,R′) |=(w,s) φ for all (w, s) ∈ U′,
where ((W′,V′,R′),U′) = (M, {w})⊗ (A,S ),
and where
α→ is given by
2 The reason to employ multiple-pointed models for updating is that it allows us to handle choice.
Suppose we want to model the action of testing whether φ, followed by a public announcement of
the result. This involves choice: if the outcome of the test is affirmative, then do this, else do that.
Choice is modelled in a straightforward way in multiple-pointed action models. Once we allow
multiple-pointed action models, it is reasonable to also take our doxastic models to be multiple-
pointed, with the multiple points constraining the whereabouts of the actual world.
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i→ := RM(i)
?φ→ := {(w,w) | M |=w φ}
α1∪α2→ := α1→∪ α2→
α1;α2→ := {(x,y)|∃z(x α1→ z)&(z α2→ y)}
α∗→ := the reflexive transitive closure of α→ .
There is a small problem in the logic of KD45 structures with KD45 updates,
namely that this model class is not closed under execution of such updates. A single-
agent example suffices to demonstrate that: consider a KD45 agent incorrectly be-
lieving that p: ¬p∧Bip. Now inform this agent of the truth of ¬p. His accessibility
relation has become empty... and is no longer serial, i.e., the D axiom is no longer
satisfied. The agent now believes everything! This means that the logic cannot be
complete with respect to the KD45 class of Kripke structures. However, various
other completeness results can be obtained.
In [12] it is shown that this logic is axiomatized by the axioms and inference rules
of doxastic PDL, plus a set of reduction axioms that are generated from the action
models by means of a process of program transformation (and, to be explicit: minus
the D45 axioms for the
i→ relations, but including the general modal K axiom).
The logic with the K45 axioms (introspection, but no consistency of beliefs) is also
complete with respect to the K45 structures / K45 updates; and the logic with the S5
axioms is complete with respect to S5 structures and updates.
In the next section we will use (appropriate fragments of) this logical system to
model what goes on in manipulative communication, and in Section 1.5 we will
employ it to analyse what goes on in Liar’s Dice. We should point out that the sub-
stitutions that form part of the logic of communication and change are not actually
used in our modelling of lying, but only in the doxastic analysis of the Liar’s Dice
game, in Section 1.5.
1.3 The Logic of Lying in Public Discourse
We get lied to in the public domain, all the time, by people who have an interest in
obfuscating the truth. In 1993 the tobacco company Philip Morris tried to discredit
a report on Respiratory Health Effects of Passive Smoking by founding, through a
hired intermediary, a fake citizen’s group called The Advancement of Sound Science
or TASSC, to cast doubt on it. Exxon-Mobile used the same organisation to spread
disinformation about global warming.3 Their main ploy: hang the label of ‘junk sci-
ence’ on peer-reviewed scientific papers on smoking hazards or global warming,
and promote propaganda disguised as research as ‘sound science’. It worked beauti-
fully for a while, until the New York Times exposed the fraud [25]. As a result, many
3 See http://www.exxonsecrets.org/html/orgfactsheet.php?id=6.
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educated people who should know better are still in doubt about the reality of global
warming, or think the issues are just too hard for them to understand.
It has frequently been noted that the surest result of brainwashing in the long run is a peculiar
kind of cynicism, the absolute refusal to believe in the truth of anything, no matter how well
it may be established. In other words, the result of a consistent and total substitution of lies
for factual truth is not that the lie will now be accepted as truth, and truth be defamed as
lie, but that the sense by which we take our bearings in the real world—and the category of
truth versus falsehood is among the mental means to this end—is being destroyed.
Hannah Arendt, “Truth and Politics”, 1967 [2].
Now this situation where complete cynicism reigns is one extreme attitude to con-
front lying. This is of course at the price of also no longer believing the truth. This
attitude will be explored in our analysis of the game Liar’s Dice, where the rules of
the game allow any utterance regardless of its truth. The only thing that counts is
winning. As everyone knows this, this is some kind of fair play.
The other extreme is the attitude where all lies are believed. This will be the logic
of successful lies, successful as we model the effect of lies being taken as the truth
by addressees, even at the price of believing inconsistencies. Below we will give a
logic of possibly deceptive public speech acts, to model the effects of lying as in
politics. Proposition 1.9 below can be seen as a clear vindication that Arendt is right
about the grave consequences of lying in politics.
First, take the prototypical example of lying about p. Picture an initial situation
where agent a knows that p, and agent a knows that agents b,c do not know that p.
One way to picture this initial situation is like this:
2 : p 3 : p
0 : p 1 : p
bc
bc bc
abc
abc abc
abc abc
The grey shading indicates that 0 is the actual world. The picture assumes transitivity
of the accessibilities; e.g., 0 and 3 are b-connected. Note that agent a believes that
p (agent a even knows that p, but this difference is immaterial to our analysis), but
agents b,c also consider it possible that agent a believes the opposite (which is the
case in world 1), or that agent a has no beliefs whatsoever about p (the situation in
worlds 2 and 3).
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In typical examples of bearing witness in court, the situation is often a bit dif-
ferent. In cases of providing an alibi, for example, the question ‘Was the accused at
home with you during the evening of June 6th?’ is posed on the understanding that
the witness is in a position to know the true answer, even if nobody can check that
she is telling the truth.
Let us assume that everyone knows that a knows whether p. The picture now
becomes:
0 : p 1 : p
bc
abc abc
Assume agent a sends a group communication to b,c to the effect that ¬p. Would
this be a correct communication model for the lie that ¬p? To distinguish static from
dynamic information, the alternatives of the update are squared and not circled.
0 : ¬p 1 : >aabc abc
It is easy to see that this cannot be right. The result of this update is a model that
has no actual worlds, i.e., an inconsistent model. The actual worlds of an update are
pairs (w,e) where w is an actual world of the input doxastic model and e an actual
event of the update model, and w satisfies the precondition of e. Since the actual
world has p true, and the precondition of the actual action is ¬p, there are no such
pairs.
Rather, the misleading communication should be modelled as a KD45 action
model, as follows:
0 : > 1 : ¬pbca abc
The misleading agent a knows that no truthful communication is being made, but
the two agents b,c mistakenly believe that ¬p is being truthfully asserted. The fact
that the originator of the lie does believe that p is true can be taken on board as well,
of course:
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0 : Bap 1 : ¬pbca abc
We can see this update equally as agent a lying about p, or as an observer, not
modelled in the system, lying about agent a believing that p. The agency—that
agent a is lying—is only implicit in this dynamic doxastic logic, namely by having
execution preconditions of the form Baφ. We cannot call it explicit, because it cannot
be distinguished from the (in fact more proper) perspective of an observer ‘knowing’
(believing, and with justification, as he is omniscient) that Baφ.
Updating the initial model with this action model gives:
(0,0) : p (1,1) : p
bc
a abc
Note that the precondition Bap forces the actual event 0 to match with the actual
world 0, so that the new model has an actual world (0,0). Similarly for world 1 and
event 1.
This is a model where a believes that p, where b,c mistakenly believe that ¬p,
and where b,c also believe that a believes that ¬p. Note that the model is KD45:
beliefs are still consistent ([i]φ→ 〈i〉φ holds in the model), but the model is not
truthful anymore (there are φ and i for which [i]φ→ φ does not hold). The postulate
of truthfulness has been replaced by the weaker postulate of consistency (the D
postulate [i]φ→ 〈i〉φ).
This way to model lying suggests a natural generalization of the well-studied
concept of a public announcement. In the logic of public announcements [26, 20],
a public announcement !φ is always taken to be a true statement. A more realistic
version of public announcements leaves open the possibility of deceit, as follows. A
possibly deceptive public announcement φ is a kind of ‘if then else’ action. In case
φ is true, the announcement is a public update with φ, in case φ is false, the public
is deceived into taking φ as true. The manipulative update with p by an outside
observer (the announcer/speaker, who is not modelled as an agent in the structure),
in a setting where the public consists of a,b,c, looks like this:
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0 : ¬p
1 : p
2 : p
abc
abc
abc
There are two actual events, one for the situation where p is true – in this case, the
public is duly informed — and one for the situation where p is false – in this case the
public is misled to believe that p. This action model can be simplified, as follows:
0 : ¬p 1 : pabc abc
Call this the two-pointed manipulative update for p. We will refer to this action
model as Up. The variation on this action model where only event 0 is actual will
be referred to as U0p. This action model denotes the lie with p. The variant with
only event 1 actual will be referred to as U1p. This action model denotes the public
announcement with p.
Let us introduce operations for these actions. The manipulative update with φ is
denoted ‡φ, and its two variants are denoted ¡φ (for the lie that φ) and !φ (for the
public announcement that φ).
Now it turns out that the logic of individual belief and manipulative update, has a
simple axiomatisation in terms of reduction axioms, just like the logic of individual
knowledge and public announcement.
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ1∧φ2 | Biφ | [‡φ1]φ2 | [¡φ1]φ2 | [!φ1]φ2
Interpretation as sketched above:
• [‡φ]ψ is true in a model M at a world w if ψ is true in both (w,0) and (w,1) of
updated model M⊗U.
• [¡φ]ψ is true in a model M at a world w if ψ is true in (w,0) of updated model
M⊗U0.
• [!φ]ψ is true in a model M at a world w if ψ is true in (w,1) of updated model
M⊗U1.
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A complete axiomatisation is formed by the usual K axioms for Bi (we cannot
take the KD45 axioms, as updates may result in empty accessibility relations, see the
previous section), modus ponens, necessitation for Bi, ‡φ, ¡φ and !φ, and reduction
axioms for the [‡φ], [¡φ], [!φ] modalities:
[‡φ]ψ ↔ [¡φ]ψ∧ [!φ]ψ
This defines the effect of [‡φ] in terms of those of [!φ] and [¡φ]. Next, we have the
usual reduction axioms for public announcement:
[!φ]p ↔ φ→ p
[!φ]¬ψ ↔ φ→¬[!φ]ψ
[!φ](ψ1∧ψ2) ↔ [!φ]ψ1∧ [!φ]ψ2
[!φ]Biψ ↔ φ→ Bi[!φ]ψ
Finally, the reduction axioms for lying:
[¡φ]p ↔ ¬φ→ p
[¡φ]¬ψ ↔ ¬φ→¬[¡φ]ψ
[¡φ](ψ1∧ψ2) ↔ [¡φ]ψ1∧ [¡φ]ψ2
[¡φ]Biψ ↔ ¬φ→ Bi[!φ]ψ
The final axiom of this list is the most interesting: it expresses that believing ψ
after a lie that φ amounts to the belief that a public announcement of φ implies ψ,
conditioned by ¬φ.
Since all these axioms have the form of equivalences, completeness of the cal-
culus of manipulation and individual belief follows from a reduction argument, as
in the case of public announcements with individual knowledge. We refer to [12]
for a general perspective on proving communication logics complete by means of
reduction axioms.
Theorem 1.1. The calculus of manipulation and individual belief is complete for
the class of the (multi-)K models.
Another way to see that the logic is complete is by means of the observation that this
is the special case of the Logic of Communication and Change (LCC, [12]) where
updates are restricted to manipulations, announcements and lies, and where doxas-
tic programs are restricted to individual accessibilities. Then apply the equivalence
between [A, s]Biφ and pre(A, s)→∧{t|s i→t} Bi[A, t]φ.
Interestingly, our logic of manipulation is closely related to the variation on pub-
lic announcement that is used in [21, 23] (and going back to [20]) to analyse the
‘surprise exam puzzle’, where public announcement of φ is defined as an operation
that restricts the doxastic alternatives of the agents to the worlds where φ is true, i.e.,
Mφ is the model where each Ri gets replaced by R
φ
i given by R
φ
i (w) = [[φ]]∩Ri(w).
Using †φ for this alternative announcement, the corresponding reduction axiom is
[†φ]Biψ↔ Bi(φ→ [†φ]ψ).
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A forerunner of our logic is the analysis of suspicions and lies in [4], which is
further elaborated in [8] and [30]; the latter (actually a follow-up of the first version
of the present paper) addresses more agency aspects in lying, such as the assumption
that the addressee does not yet (firmly) believe the opposite of the lie—you don’t
want to be caught out as a liar!
At first sight, this alternative semantics for announcement takes us outside of
the framework sketched in Section 1.2 above. However, if †φ is an alternative an-
nouncement, then we have:
Proposition 1.1. M,w |= [†φ]ψ iff M,w |= [‡φ]ψ.
Alternative announcement turns out to be the same as manipulative updating, and
our analysis can be viewed as a decomposition of alternative announcement into
public lying and (regular) public announcement.
Regular public announcements can be expressed in terms of manipulative updat-
ing:
Proposition 1.2. ` [!φ]ψ↔ (φ→ [‡φ]ψ).
The proof is by induction on ψ and is left to the reader.
It is the case that the logic of public announcement and the logic of manipulation
have the same expressive power: this follows from the fact that they both reduce
to multi-modal KD45. But note that the logic of manipulative updating has greater
‘action expressivity’ than the logic of public announcement: the logic of [!φ] has
no means to express an operation mapping S5 models to KD45 models, and [‡φ] is
such an operation.
As an example of reasoning with the calculus, we use the axioms to show that
a manipulative update followed by a belief is equivalent to a belief followed by the
corresponding public announcement:
Proposition 1.3. ` [‡φ]Biψ↔ Bi[!φ]ψ.
Proof.
[‡φ]Biψ↔ ([¡φ]Biψ∧ [!φ]Biψ)↔ ((¬φ→ Bi[!φ]ψ)∧ (φ→ Bi[!φ]ψ))↔ Bi[!φ]ψ.
An important difference between manipulative update and public announcement
shows up when we work out the preconditions of inconsistency after an update. For
announcements we get:
Proposition 1.4. ` [!φ]⊥↔ ¬φ.
Proof.
[!φ]⊥↔ [!φ](p∧¬p)↔ ([!φ]p∧ [!φ]¬p)↔ ([!φ]p∧ (φ→¬[!φ]p))
↔ ((φ→ p)∧ (φ→¬p))↔¬φ
This shows that a public announcement with φ leads to an inconsistent state iff the
negation of φ is true. Similarly, it is easy to work out that a public lie that φ leads to
an inconsistency iff φ is true, i.e., we can derive
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Proposition 1.5. ` [¡φ]⊥↔ φ.
Using this we can work out the preconditions for inconsistency after a manipulative
update:
Proposition 1.6. ` [‡φ]⊥↔⊥.
Proof.
[‡φ]⊥↔ ([!φ]⊥∧ [¡φ]⊥) Prop 1.5↔ (¬φ∧φ)↔⊥
This means that a manipulative update in a consistent state will never lead to
inconsistency (although, of course, it may lead to an agent having an inconsistent
set of beliefs, which is different).
The following proposition about public announcements can be proved by induc-
tion on φ. It shows that if we update with an inconsistency, the resulting model is
inconsistent:
Proposition 1.7. ` [!⊥]φ↔>.
In the case of manipulatively updating with an inconsistency, the result is not
an inconsistent model, but a model where all accessibilities have vanished. In the
particular case of an i-belief, we get:
Proposition 1.8. ` [‡⊥]Biφ↔>.
Proof.
[‡⊥]Biφ↔ ([!⊥]Biφ∧ [¡⊥]Biφ)↔ (>∧Bi[!⊥]φ)↔ Bi[!⊥]φ Prop 1.7↔ Bi>↔>.
After a manipulative update with an inconsistency, the public will no longer be able
to distinguish what is false from what is true.
Finally, the following proposition spells out under what conditions our ‘sense by
which we take our bearings in the real world’ is destroyed. This happens exactly
when we are manipulated into accepting as truth what flatly contradicts our firm
belief:
Proposition 1.9. ` [‡φ]Bi⊥↔ Bi¬φ.
Proof.
[‡φ]Bi⊥↔ ([!φ]Bi⊥∧ [¡φ]Bi⊥)↔ ((φ→ Bi[!φ]⊥)∧ (¬φ→ Bi[!φ]⊥))
↔ ((φ→ Bi¬φ)∧ (¬φ→ Bi¬φ))↔ Bi¬φ.
We can generalize our logic to a full logic of manipulative updating, i.e., according
to the full relational action description in the Logic of Communication and Change
that was introduced in Section 1.2. For details, please see the Appendix.
In this section we have investigated the effect of lying in public discourse. In
such a setting the agents assume that they are told the truth and in the event of a
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lie, the agents hearing the lie do not believe that the announcement is actually a lie.
This causes them to believe a false thing. In Section 1.5 we will analyse lying in a
different setting, where the agents are playing a game of Liar’s Dice and following
a game strategy. But first, we will give a game-theoretical analysis of the game to
see how lying affects a game’s outcome.
1.4 Liar’s Dice — Game-Theoretical Analysis
In his later years as a saint, Augustine held the opinion that lying, even in jest, is
wrong, but as the young and playful sinner that he was before his turn to seriousness
he may well have enjoyed an occasional game of dice. We will examine a simplified
version of two-person Liar’s Dice, and show by means of a game-theoretical anal-
ysis that it is precisely the possibility of lying — using private information in order
to mislead an opponent — that makes the game interesting.
In our simplified version of Liar’s Dice, the die is replaced by a coin. A typical
move of the game is tossing a coin and inspecting the result while keeping it hidden
from the other player. Here is a description of what goes on, and what the options
of the two players are.
• Players a and b both stake one euro: Player a bets on heads, Player b bets on tails.
• Player a tosses a coin and observes the outcome (heads or tails), while keeping it
concealed from player b.
• Player a announces either ‡Head or ‡Tail.
• If a announces ‡Tail, she then simply loses her one euro to player b and game
ends (for a bets on heads, so she announces defeat).
• If a announces ‡Head, she adds one euro to the stake and the game continues.
• In response to ‡Head, b either passes (gives up) or challenges “I don’t believe
that, you liar”) and adds 1 euro to the stake.
• If b passes, a wins the stake, and the game ends.
• If b challenges, and the toss was heads, a wins the stake, otherwise b wins the
stake. The game ends.
Player a has two information states: Heads and Tails, while player b has a single
information state, for player b cannot distinguish the two possible outcomes of the
toss. We will give a game-theoretic analysis of how player a can exploit her ‘in-
formation advantage’ to the utmost, and of how player b can react to minimize her
losses, on the assumption that the procedure is repeated a large number of times.
The following picture gives the extensive game form. The first move is made by
Chance; this move gives the outcome of the coin toss. Then player a reacts, letting
her move depend on the toss outcome. Finally, player b decides whether to pass or
challenge. This decision does not depend on the coin toss; player b cannot distin-
guish the state where a announced ‡Head on seeing heads from the state where she
is bluffing. In the picture of the extensive game form (Figure 1.1) this is expressed
by a dotted line.
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Chance
a a
H T
−1,1 b
‡T ‡H
b −1,1
‡H ‡T
1,−1 2,−2
P C
1,−1 −2,2
P C
Fig. 1.1 Extensive game form for Liar’s Dice game.
The leaves of the game tree indicate the payoffs. If the game sequence is Heads,
‡Tail, the payoffs are −1 euro for player a and 1 euro for player b. The same for
the sequence Tails, ‡Tail. Player a gets 1 euro and player b gets −1 euro for the se-
quences Heads, ‡Head, Pass, and Tail, ‡Head, Pass (these are the sequences where
2 gives up). The sequence Heads, ‡Head, Challenge is a win for player a, with
payoff 2 euros, and −2 euros for player b. The sequence Tails, ‡Head, Challenge,
finally, is a win for player b, with payoff 2 euros, and −2 euros for player a.
Player a has four strategies: (‡Head, ‡Head) (‡Head in case of heads and in case
of tails), (‡Head, ‡Tail) (‡Head in case of heads, ‡Tail in case of tails), (‡Tail,
‡Head), and (‡Tail, ‡Tail). Player b has two strategies: Pass and Challenge. To
find the strategic game form, one has to take the average of the expected payoffs for
the two cases of heads and tails. E.g., if player a plays (‡Head, ‡Tail) and player
b responds with Challenge, then in the long run in 12 of the cases the outcome will
be heads, and player a wins 2 euros, and in 12 of the cases the outcome will be tails,
and player a loses 1 euro (for her strategy is just to give up in such cases). Thus, the
expected payoff is 12 ×2− 12 ×1 = 12 euro for player a, and because the game is zero
sum, − 12 euro for player b. The strategic game form is given by:
Pass Challenge
‡Head, ‡Head 1,-1 0,0
‡Head, ‡Tail 0,0 12 ,− 12
‡Tail, ‡Head 0,0 − 32 , 32‡Tail, ‡Tail -1,1 -1,1
It is easy to see that there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium (a Nash equilibrium
is a combination of strategies, one for each player, with the property that neither
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of the players can improve their payoff by unilaterally deviating from her strategy).
Clearly, none of the eight strategy pairs has this property.
Now let’s consider the strategy (‡Tail, ‡Tail) for a. This is the strategy of the
doomed loser: even when the toss is heads the player still announces ‡Tail. This is
obviously not the best thing that a can do. Always announcing ‡Head gives a much
better payoff in the long run. In other words, the strategy (‡Tail,‡Tail) is strictly
dominated by (‡Head, ‡Head). Similar for the strategy of the unconditional liar:
(‡Tail,‡Head). It is also strictly dominated by the strategy (‡Head,‡Head). Thus,
we are left with:
Pass Challenge
‡Head,‡Head 1,-1 0,0
‡Head, ‡Tail 0,0 12 ,− 12
Suppose a plays (‡Head, ‡Head) with probability p and (‡Head, ‡Tail) with
probability 1− p. Then her expected value is p for her first strategy, and 12 (1− p)
for her second strategy. Any choice of p where the expected payoff for p is different
from that for 1− p can be exploited by the other player. Therefore, player a should
play her first strategy with probability p = 12 (1− p), i.e., p = 13 , and her second strat-
egy with probability 1− p = 23 . For player b, we can reason similarly. Suppose b
plays Pass with probability q and Challenge with probability 1− q. Again, the ex-
pected values for q and 1−q should be the same, for otherwise this mixed strategy
can be exploited by the other player. The expected value is −q for her first strategy
and − 12 (1− q) for her second strategy. Thus, she should play her first strategy with
probability q= 12 (1−q), i.e., q= 13 . Neither player can improve on her payoff by uni-
lateral deviation from these strategies, so the mixed strategy where a plays (‡Head,
‡Head) in 13 of the cases and b plays Pass in 13 of the cases is a Nash equilibrium. In
other words, the best that player a can do is always announcing the truth and raise
the stakes when her toss is heads, and lying in one third of the cases when her toss is
tails, and b’s best response to this is to Pass in one third of all cases and Challenge
two thirds of the time.
The game-theoretic analysis yields that lying pays off for player a, and that player
b, knowing this, may reasonably expect to catch player a on a lie in one sixth of all
cases. The value of the game is 13 euro, and the solution is
1
3 (‡Head, ‡Head), 23
(‡Head, ‡Tail) as player a’s optimal strategy, and 13 Pass, 23 Challenge as player
b’s optimal strategy. It is clear that the honest strategy (‡Head, ‡Tail) is not the
optimal one for player a: given that player b plays 13 Pass and
2
3 Challenge, the
expected payoff for player a is only 16 if she sticks to the honest strategy. Lying
indeed pays off sometimes.
If we modify the game so that player a cannot lie anymore, by refusing her the
privilege of having a peek at the toss outcome, the game immediately becomes a
lot less interesting. In the extensive game form for this version, an extra dotted line
indicates that player a cannot distinguish the outcome Heads from the outcome
Tails. See Figure 1.2.
Player a has just two strategies left, ‡Head and ‡Tail, and the strategic form of
the game becomes:
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Chance
a a
H T
−1,1 b
‡T ‡H
b −1,1
‡H ‡T
1,−1 2,−2
P C
1,−1 −2,2
P C
Fig. 1.2 Modified game where player a has no information advantage.
Pass Challenge
‡Head 1,-1 0,0
‡Tail -1,1 -1,1
The strategy ‡Tail for player a is weakly dominated by ‡Head, so it can be elimi-
nated, and we are left with:
Pass Challenge
‡Head 1,-1 0,0
The strategy pair (‡Head, Challenge) is a Nash equilibrium. The game-theoretic
analysis predicts that a rational player a will always play ‡Head, and a rational
player b will always Challenge, and the game becomes a pure zero-sum game of
chance. Surely, it is the possibility of lying that makes Liar’s Dice an interesting
game.
1.5 Liar’s Dice — Doxastic Analysis
In the game of Liar’s Dice, when player a announces Heads while she actually
saw that the outcome of the toss was Tails, she is announcing something which
she believes to be false with the intent to be believed. This certainly seems to be
a lie. However, we usually do not condemn people who tell such a lie in a game
as untruthful. In fact, in this game player a is supposed to lie sometimes, or she
would never win. This is an important point: player a intends player b to believe
her, but she probably does not expect it, because player b may very well expect
player a to lie sometimes. As we have already seen, it is completely immaterial in
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Liar’s Dice whether an announcement is true or false: the only reasons for one or the
other are strategic, and in view of winning the game. In this section we will analyse
the game of Liar’s Dice from a doxastic viewpoint in order to answer the question:
is lying really lying, when one is actually supposed to lie? Of course, under these
circumstances the answer is: no.
For our analysis we will use the doxastic model checker DEMO [17]. Using
DEMO, we can automatically check the truth of formulas in a doxastic model. One
of the authors, Floor Sietsma, has extended DEMO with factual changes to allow
action models with substitutions and also with the possibility to store integer values
(in the Bachelor’s Thesis [29] dating from 2007). We will use this extended model
checker. The code of this model checker is available from http://www.cwi.nl/ si-
etsma/DEMO/. We show how the game of Liar’s Dice can be modelled using
DEMO, and we demonstrate the doxastic models that we get if we trace a particular
run of the game. For full details please see the Appendix.
The conclusion of this analysis is that, even though in the game of Liar’s Dice
lying takes place according to the definition of Augustine, no misleading is taking
place and the players are never duped into believing a falsehood. This is shown by
the fact that all updates in the games, as modelled in the Appendix, are S5 updates:
instead of unquestioningly taking for granted what they are being told, all players
consider the opposite of what they are being told equally likely.
1.6 Conclusion
There are still two discrepancies in the paper that we have to address. The first one
is between our treatment of lying in public discourse and our treatment of lying in
games. As we have seen, lying in public discourse can lead to KD45 models, which
illustrates the fact that genuine misleading takes place. We argued that the players
in a game like Liar’s Dice are never actually misled, so in a sense no real lying
takes place here at all. But one might also say that lying is attempted, but due to
the smartness of the opponent, these attempts are never really believed. So lying in
public discourse and lying in games are connected after all.
The difference between the two settings could be seen as a difference in the pro-
tocol the agents are following. In public discourse, the agents usually assume that
they are following the protocol “only speak the truth”. Therefore, when one of them
deviates from the protocol by telling a lie, the others believe him and are misled.
In the game of Liar’s Dice, the protocol is “say anything in order to improve your
payoff”. Since all agents know that the others are following the protocol, they do
not believe each other’s lies. The issue of protocol dynamics in epistemic modelling
is explored further in [31].
The second discrepancy is between the game-theoretical analysis of lying in
games in terms of mixed strategies that use probabilities, and the logical analysis
in terms of truth values. To see that these perspectives still do not quite match, con-
sider the game situation where player a tosses the coin, observes the result, and
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announces ‘heads’. In our logical analysis this does not lead to the false belief of
player b that the coin has landed heads; it does not lead to a belief change at all. But
the game-theoretical analysis reveals that a rational agent would have formed a be-
lief about the probability that the claim is true. So it seems that the logical analysis
is still too crude.
This defect could be remedied by using probabilistic beliefs and probabilistic
updates, in the style of [11], which would allow us to express the probability of
actions in the game. With these, we can model the fact that the game-theoretical
analysis in terms of mixed strategies is common knowledge. For if this is the case,
it is common knowledge that if the toss is tails, then player a will announce ‘heads’
with probability 13 and ‘tails’ with probability
2
3 .
Interestingly, this is also relevant for the first discrepancy. For why are the players
not duped into believing falsehoods, in the game of Liar’s Dice? Because they look
further than a single run of the game, and they know that as the game gets repeated
they can adhere to mixed strategies. Therefore, an analysis in terms of manipulative
probabilistic updates might work for both lying in public discourse and lying in
games.
But there is need here for further work. Even if we switch to a probabilistic
version of the logic of communication and change, we have to attach probabilities
to the update actions that we start with. This leaves open the problem of how to use
logic to derive the correct Nash equilibria in the first place. In future work we will
explore the possibility of letting agents find such solutions by iterative playing of the
game and updating their probabilities until a fixpoint representing an equilibrium is
reached.
Other areas of future work are the connection of the logic of lying with belief
revision and the modelling of agency. Believing a lie might have the consequence
that an initial true belief is given up in favour of a false one. This will only happen,
however, if the original true belief is held weakly enough to be replaced by the lie.
In modelling a lie as a publicly announced falsehood that is believed by the audience
we have left out the liar. To get the liar back into the picture, one has to analyse the
preconditions for a lie, in terms of the doxastics of the input model. For agent i to be
the originator of a lie, i has to believe φ and announce ¬φ, so Biφ is a precondition
of the lying action. This issue will be taken up in future work.
Finally, we must mention the fact that in philosophy and logic there is a long
standing interest in liar paradoxes. Now it seems that our language is not power-
ful enough to express such paradoxes. What happens if we add a mechanism for
self reference to dynamic doxastic logic? Does this immediately lead to either in-
completeness or inconsistency? What is the simplest possible way of expressing
liar paradoxes in (an extension of) dynamic doxastic logic, and what happens as a
result?
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1.7 Appendix: The Full Logic of Manipulative Updating
The full logic of manipulative updating extends the logic of lies and individual be-
liefs from Section 1.3 to doxastic PDL. It consists of doxastic PDL extended with
manipulative updates, lies and announcements:
α ::= i |?φ | α1;α2 | α1∪α2 | α∗
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ1∧φ2 | [α]φ | [‡φ1]φ2 | [¡φ1]φ2 | [!φ1]φ2
There is a complete axiomatisation: the axioms and rules of PDL, the axioms of
KD45, necessitation for [‡φ], [¡φ], [!φ], and the following reduction axioms for the
three update modalities.
The definition of ‡ in terms of ¡ and ! is as in Section 1.3:
[‡φ]ψ ↔ [¡φ]ψ∧ [!φ]ψ
Reduction axioms for public announcement are as follows:
[!φ]p ↔ φ→ p
[!φ]¬ψ ↔ φ→¬[!φ]ψ
[!φ](ψ1∧ψ2) ↔ [!φ]ψ1∧ [!φ]ψ2
[!φ][i]ψ ↔ [?φ; i][!φ]ψ
[!φ][?χ]ψ ↔ [?φ; ?χ][!φ]ψ
[!φ][α1;α2]ψ ↔ [!φ][α1][α2]ψ
[!φ][α1∪α2]ψ ↔ [!φ]([α1]ψ∧ [α2]ψ)
[!φ][α∗]ψ ↔ [α′∗][!φ]ψ
where α′ such that [!φ][α]ψ↔ [α′][!φ]ψ
It can be shown by an inductive argument that for every doxastic program α, every
announcement !φ, and every postcondition ψ a doxastic program α′ exists such that
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[!φ][α]ψ↔ [α′][!φ]ψ. This α′, which does not have to be unique, can be found by
applying the above reduction axioms.
Reduction axioms for public lies:
[¡φ]p ↔ ¬φ→ p
[¡φ]¬ψ ↔ ¬φ→¬[¡φ]ψ
[¡φ](ψ1∧ψ2) ↔ [¡φ]ψ1∧ [¡φ]ψ2
[¡φ][i]ψ ↔ [?¬φ; i][!φ]ψ
[¡φ][?χ]ψ ↔ [?¬φ; ?χ][!φ]ψ
[¡φ][α1;α2]ψ ↔ [¡φ][α1][α2]ψ
[¡φ][α1∪α2]ψ ↔ [¡φ]([α1]ψ∧ [α2]ψ)
[¡φ][α∗]ψ ↔ [α′;α′′∗][!φ]ψ
where α′ such that [¡φ][α]ψ↔ [α′][!φ]ψ
and α′′ such that [!φ][α]ψ↔ [α′′][!φ]ψ
Again, it can be shown by an inductive argument that for every doxastic program
α, every lie ¡φ, and every postcondition ψ, a doxastic programs α′ exists such that
[¡φ][α]ψ↔ [α′][!φ]ψ.
The α′ and α′′ in the axioms for α∗ can be viewed as the transformed versions of
the programs α, where the update operator acts as a doxastic program transformer.
To give an example, suppose α = i∪ j, and we want to calculate the way common
belief of i and j is transformed by a public lie that φ. Then the transformed program
for i∪ j becomes ?¬φ; i∪ j, i.e., we have:
[¡φ][i∪ j]ψ↔ [?¬φ; i∪ j][!φ]ψ.
Similarly for the way common belief of i and j is transformed by a public announce-
ment: the transformed program for i∪ j becomes ?φ; i∪ j, and we have:
[!φ][i∪ j]ψ↔ [?φ; i∪ j][!φ]ψ.
Using these transformed programs, we see that the reduction axiom for (i∪ j)∗ takes
the shape:
[¡φ][(i∪ j)∗]ψ↔ [?¬φ; i∪ j; (?φ; i∪ j)∗][!φ]ψ.
This expresses that after a lie with φ, i and j have a common belief that ψ iff in
the model before the lie it holds that along all i∪ j paths that start from a ¬φ world
and that pass only through φ worlds, [!φ]ψ is true. Note that this is a ‘relativized
common belief’ similar to the relativized common knowledge that is needed to get
a reduction style analysis going of public announcement in the presence of common
knowledge.
In fact, the style of axiomatisation that we have adopted is borrowed from the
reduction axioms formulated in terms of program transformations, in [12]. In the
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same manner as in [12] we can derive (with the restriction to multi-K models, not
to multi-KD45 models):
Theorem 1.2. The calculus of manipulative updating is complete.
1.8 Appendix: Liar’s Dice in DEMO
First we will closely examine the different actions that take place in the game and
their representations as action models. Let p represent the value of a coin, with
1 signifying heads, and 0 signifying tails. Let agents a and b represent the two
players, and let C1 represent the contents of the purse of player a (C for cash), and
C2 that of player b, with natural number values representing the amounts in euros
that each player has in her purse. These natural number registers are available in the
new extension of DEMO. Let S 1,S 2 represent the money at stake for each player.
Factual change can be thought of as assignment of new values to variables. This is
an essential ingredient of the various actions in the game:
Initialisation Both players put one euro at stake, and they both know this. S 1 :=
1,C1 :=C1−1,S 2 := 1,C2 :=C2−1, together with public announcement of these
factual changes.
Heads Factual change of the propositional value of a coin p to 1, with private
communication of the result to player a (p = 1 signifies heads).
Tails Factual change of the propositional value of a coin p to 0, with private com-
munication of the result to player a. (p = 0 signifies tails).
Announce Player a announces either ‡Head or ‡Tail. There are several ways to
model this and we will come back to this later.
Pass Player b passes and loses, player a gets the stakes. C1 :=C1 +S 1 +S 2,S 1 :=
0,S 2 := 0.
Challenge Public setting of C2 := C2 − 1,S 2 := S 2 + 1, followed by public an-
nouncement of the value of p. If the outcome is p then C1 := C1 +S 1 +S 2, oth-
erwise C2 :=C2 +S 1 +S 2 and in any case S 1 := 0,S 2 := 0.
We will show how these actions can be defined as doxastic action models in
Haskell code using DEMO.
module Lies
where
import DEMOFCR
We first define the cash and stakes of each player as integer registers.
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c1, c2, s1, s2 :: Reg
c1 = (Rg 1); c2 = (Rg 2)
s1 = (Rg 3); s2 = (Rg 4)
This declares four integer registers, and gives them appropriate names. The initial
contents of the purses of the two players must also be defined. Let’s assume both
players have five euros in cash to start with.
initCash1, initCash2 :: Integer
initCash1 = 5
initCash2 = 5
Initialisation of the game: both players put one euro at stake. This is modelled by
the following factual change: S 1 := 1,C1 :=C1−1,S 2 := 1,C2 :=C2−1. The repre-
sentation of this in our modelling language is straightforward. We just represent the
contents of the registers at startup.
initGame :: EM
initGame = (Mo
[0]
[(0,([],[(s1,1),(s2,1),
(c1,(initCash1-1)),(c2,(initCash2-1))]))]
[a,b]
[(a,0,0),(b,0,0)]
[0])
Tossing the coin is a factual change of p to 0 or 1. The coin is tossed secretly and
before player a looks both players don’t know the value of the coin. Because of this
there are two worlds, one where p is set to 0 and one where p is set to 1, and neither
of the two players can distinguish these worlds.
toss :: Integer -> FAM
toss c ags = (Mo
[0,1]
[(0,(Top,[(P 0,Neg(Top))],[])),
(1,(Top,[(P 0,Top)],[]))]
ags
[(ag,w,w’) | w <- [0,1],
w’ <- [0,1], ag <- ags]
[c])
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Note that the action model has a list that assigns to each world a triple consisting
of a precondition, a change to the propositions, and a change to the registers. In
world 0, the precondition is > and the change is to set p to value ¬>, i.e., ⊥ (and
there is no change to the registers), and in world 1, the precondition is again > and
the change is to set p to value > (and again, there is no change to the registers).
After the coin is tossed player a looks under the cup without showing the coin to
player b. We define a generic function for computing the model of the action where
a group of agents looks under the cup. These models consist of two worlds, one
where p is true (heads) and one where p is false (tails), the agents in the group can
distinguish these two worlds and the other agents cannot.
look :: [Agent] -> FAM
look group ags = (Mo
[0,1]
[(0,(p,[],[])),(1,(Neg(p),[],[]))]
ags
([(ag,w,w’) | w <- [0,1], w’ <- [0,1],
ag <- (ags \\ group)] ++
[(ag,w,w) | w <- [0,1], ag <- group])
[0,1])
In this case, there are no changes to propositions or registers, but world 0 has
precondition p, and world 1 has precondition ¬p.
Now we define the models of the situation after the coin has been tossed and
player a has looked at the outcome, distinguishing the two outcomes of the toss:
headsg :: EM
headsg = upd (upd initGame (toss 1)) (look [a])
tailsg :: EM
tailsg = upd (upd initGame (toss 0)) (look [a])
Before looking at the way to model the announcement of an outcome of the toss
by player a we will first define the action models for passing and challenging.
When player b passes, the stakes are added to player a’s cash: C2 := C2 + S 1 +
S 1,S 1 := 0,S 2 := 0. Player b never gets to see the actual value of the coin so there
are no changes in the knowledge of the agents about p. The model for this has only
one world that indicates the changes in the stakes and cash.
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pass :: FAM
pass ags = (Mo
[0]
[(0,(Top,[],
[(s1,(I 0)),
(s2,(I 0)),
(c1,ASum [Reg c1,Reg s1,Reg s2])]))]
ags
[(ag,0,0) | ag <- ags]
[0])
Note that here for the first time we see changes to the registers.
When player b decides to challenge player a, the cup is lifted and both players
get to know the value of p. Then the stakes are added to the cash of player a in case
of heads and player b in case of tails, together with one extra euro from the cash of
player b that player b added to the stakes while challenging player a. So instead of
S 2 := S 2 + 1,C2 := C2− 1 and after that C1 := C1 + S 1 + S 2 in case of heads and
C2 := C2 + S 1 + S 2 in case of tails, we use C1 := C1 + S 1 + S 2 + 1,C2 := C2− 1
in case of heads and C2 := C2 + S 1 +S 2 in case of tails. The action model for this
has one world for the case of heads and one world for the case of tails. Both players
can distinguish these worlds because the cup was lifted, and the stakes are divided
differently in the two worlds.
challenge :: FAM
challenge ags =
Mo
[0,1]
[(0,(Neg(p),[],
[(s1,(I 0)),
(s2,(I 0)),
(c2,ASum [Reg c2,Reg s1,Reg s2])])),
(1,( p ,[],
[(s1,(I 0)),
(s2,(I 0)),
(c2,ASum [Reg c2,I (-1)]),
(c1,ASum [Reg c1,Reg s1,Reg s2,I 1])]))]
ags
[(ag,w,w) | w <- [0,1], ag <- ags]
[0,1]
When player a announces ‡Head or ‡Tail the stakes change. In case of ‡Head
C1 :=C1−1,S 1 := S 1 + 1 and in case of ‡Tail C2 :=C2 +S 1 +S 2,S 1 := 0,S 2 := 0.
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announceStakes :: Integer -> FAM
announceStakes 0 ags =
Mo
[0]
[(0,(Top,[],[(s1,(I 0)),
(s2,(I 0)),
(c2,ASum [Reg c2,Reg s1,Reg s2])]))]
ags
[(ag,0,0) | ag <- ags]
[0]
announceStakes 1 ags =
Mo
[0]
[(0,(Top,[],[(s1,ASum [Reg s1,I 1]),
(c1,ASum [Reg c1,I (-1)])]))]
ags
[(ag,0,0) | ag <- ags]
[0]
Now the only thing we have to decide is how we will model the announcement of
‡Head or ‡Tail. Suppose we would use the manipulative update ‡p or ‡¬p for this.
This would imply that the other player believes the claims that are made. However,
in a real game of Liar’s Dice player b knows that player a might very well be bluffing
and she doesn’t really believe player a’s claim at all. So to correctly model the game
we should not use the manipulative update. When player a makes an announcement
this doesn’t even change player b’s knowledge and beliefs because player b doesn’t
believe player a.
So instead of the manipulative update we should only use the model for changing
the stakes to model the announcement:
announce :: Integer -> FAM
announce = announceStakes
Now player b doesn’t know whether p is true but she knows she doesn’t know:
bKnows :: Form
bKnows = Disj [(K b (Neg p)), (K b p)]
Lies> isTrue (upd tailsg (announce 0)) bKnows
False
Lies> isTrue (upd tailsg (announce 0)) (K b (Neg bKnows))
True
Lies> isTrue (upd headsg (announce 0)) bKnows
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False
Lies> isTrue (upd headsg (announce 0)) (K b (Neg bKnows))
True
Lies> isTrue (upd tailsg (announce 1)) bKnows
False
Lies> isTrue (upd tailsg (announce 1)) (K b (Neg bKnows))
True
Lies> isTrue (upd headsg (announce 1)) bKnows
False
Lies> isTrue (upd headsg (announce 1)) (K b (Neg bKnows))
True
Note that since we did not use the manipulative update to model player a’s an-
nouncement (although it is easy to implement in DEMO, of course) the resulting
models are still S5-models.
Lies> isS5Model (upd headsg (announce 1))
True
Lies> isS5Model (upd headsg (announce 0))
True
Lies> isS5Model (upd tailsg (announce 1))
True
Lies> isS5Model (upd tailsg (announce 0))
True
This means that no actual misleading is taking place at all! This is actually very
plausible because player b knows that player a’s announcement might very well be
false. This shows that lying only creates false belief if the person who lies is believed
to be telling the truth.
Now we can use these action models to do a doxastic analysis of a game of Liar’s
Dice. The different possible games are:
1. Player a tosses tails and announces ‡Tail
2. Player a tosses heads and announces ‡Tail
3. Player a tosses tails and announces ‡Head and player b passes
4. Player a tosses tails and announces ‡Head and player b challenges
5. Player a tosses heads and announces ‡Head and player b passes
6. Player a tosses heads and announces ‡Head and player b challenges
The models for these games are:
game1, game2, game3, game4, game5, game6 :: EM
game1 = gsm (upd tailsg (announce 0))
game2 = gsm (upd headsg (announce 0))
game3 = gsm (upd (upd tailsg (announce 1)) pass)
game4 = gsm (upd (upd tailsg (announce 1)) challenge)
game5 = gsm (upd (upd headsg (announce 1)) pass)
game6 = gsm (upd (upd headsg (announce 1)) challenge)
We will now consider these six different cases in turn.
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Game 1 is the game where player 1 tosses tails and admits this.
In this case both players stake one euro and player b wins the stakes, so in the
end player a lost one euro and player b won one euro. This can be checked with
DEMO:
Lies> isTrue game1 (eq (Reg c1) (ASum [I initCash1,I (-1)]))
True
Lies> isTrue game1 (eq (Reg c2) (ASum [I initCash2,I 1]))
True
Player b doesn’t get to know what the value of the coin was:
Lies> isTrue game1 bKnows
False
The model for game 1 is:
Lies> game1
Mo
[0,1]
[(0,([],[(R1,4),(R2,6),(R3,0),(R4,0)])),
(1,([p],[(R1,4),(R2,6),(R3,0),(R4,0)]))]
[a,b]
[(a,0,0),(a,1,1),(b,0,0),(b,0,1),(b,1,0),(b,1,1)]
[0]
A picture of this model is below. There are two worlds, one where the toss was
heads and one where it was tails. Player a can distinguish these worlds, player b
cannot because player b never got to see the coin. In both worlds the cash of player
a is 4 and that of player b is 6 euros, because the division of the stakes doesn’t
depend on the value of the coin. Reflexive arrows are not shown.
0 :
p,R14,R26,
R30,R40
1 :
p,R14,R26,
R30,R40
b
Game 2 is the game where player a falsely announces ‡Head. Just like in game
1, player a loses one euro and player b wins one euro, and player b doesn’t get to
know the value of the coin.
Lies> isTrue game2 (eq (Reg c1) (ASum [I initCash1,I (-1)]))
True
Lies> isTrue game2 (eq (Reg c2) (ASum [I initCash2,I 1]))
True
Lies> isTrue game2 bKnows
False
The model for this game is almost the same as for game 1: the difference is that
now the world where p is true is actual instead of the world where p is false.
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Lies> game2
Mo
[0,1]
[(0,([],[(R1,4),(R2,6),(R3,0),(R4,0)])),
(1,([p],[(R1,4),(R2,6),(R3,0),(R4,0)]))]
[a,b]
[(a,0,0),(a,1,1),(b,0,0),(b,0,1),(b,1,0),(b,1,1)]
[1]
The picture of this model (reflexive arrows not shown) is:
0 :
p,R14,R26,
R30,R40
1 :
p,R14,R26,
R30,R40
b
The third game is the case where player a tosses tails but falsely announces
‡Head and player b passes. In this case player a stakes two euros and player b
stakes one euro, and player a gets to keep the stakes, so the final payoff is that
player a wins one euro and player b loses one euro:
Lies> isTrue game3 (eq (Reg c1) (ASum [I initCash1,I 1]))
True
Lies> isTrue game3 (eq (Reg c2) (ASum [I initCash1,I (-1)]))
True
Player b passes, so the cup is never lifted and player b doesn’t know the value of
the coin:
Lies> isTrue game3 bKnows
False
The model for this game is:
Lies> game3
Mo
[0,1]
[(0,([],[(R1,6),(R2,4),(R3,0),(R4,0)])),
(1,([p],[(R1,6),(R2,4),(R3,0),(R4,0)]))]
[a,b]
[(a,0,0),(a,1,1),(b,0,0),(b,0,1),(b,1,0),(b,1,1)]
[0]
This model has the same two worlds as the models for game 1 and 2 except for
the changes in the player’s cash.
In the fourth game, player a tosses tails but falsely announces ‡Head and player
b challenges player a. This means that both players stake one extra euro and then
the cup is lifted and player b gets the stakes.
In this case player b does know the value of the coin:
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Lies> isTrue game4 bKnows
True
The payoffs are −2 euros for player a and 2 euros for player b:
Lies> isTrue game4 (eq (Reg c1) (ASum [I initCash1,I (-2)]))
True
Lies> isTrue game4 (eq (Reg c2) (ASum [I initCash2,I 2]))
True
The model for this game is:
Lies> game4
Mo
[0]
[(0,([],[(R1,3),(R2,7),(R3,0),(R4,0)]))]
[a,b]
[(a,0,0),(b,0,0)]
[0]
This model has only one world because none of the players consider any other
world possible, because both players know the values of the coin. In this world p is
false (because the toss was tails), player a’s cash is 3 euros and player b’s cash is 7
euros. A picture of this model is below.
0 :
p,R13,R27,
R30,R40
The fifth game is the game where player a tosses heads and truthfully announces
this and player b passes. In this case the cup isn’t lifted so player b doesn’t know the
value of the coin again:
Lies> isTrue game5 bKnows
False
The payoffs are 1 for player a and −1 for player b:
Lies> isTrue game5 (eq (Reg c1) (ASum [I initCash1,I 1]))
True
Lies> isTrue game5 (eq (Reg c2) (ASum [I initCash2,I (-1)]))
True
The model for game 5 has two worlds again because player b doesn’t know the
value of the coin.
Lies> game5
Mo
[0,1]
[(0,([],[(R1,6),(R2,4),(R3,0),(R4,0)])),
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(1,([p],[(R1,6),(R2,4),(R3,0),(R4,0)]))]
[a,b]
[(a,0,0),(a,1,1),(b,0,0),(b,0,1),(b,1,0),(b,1,1)]
[1]
In game 6 player a tosses heads and truthfully announces this and player b chal-
lenges player a. In this case both players add one extra euro to the stakes, the cup is
lifted and player a gets to keep the stakes. The model for this has one world where
p is true, player a has 7 euros and player b has 3 euros.
Lies> game6
Mo
[1]
[(1,([p],[(R1,7),(R2,3),(R3,0),(R4,0)]))]
[a,b]
[(a,1,1),(b,1,1)]
[1]
In this case player b knows the value of the coin and the payoffs are 2 euros for
player 1 and −2 euros for player 2:
Lies> isTrue game6 bKnows
True
Lies> isTrue game6 (eq (Reg c1) (ASum [I initCash1,I 2]))
True
Lies> isTrue game6 (eq (Reg c2) (ASum [I initCash2,I (-2)]))
True
